Web2 Sandbox · Apex Mechanical Contractors← Web3 Sandbox

Same engine. Same threat model. Different surface.

8 threat actors. 51 attack scenarios. 8 versioned runs.96.1% of attacks blocked against a simulated $80M mid-market construction firm.

96.1%

Catch rate (run-008)

49/51

Attacks blocked

8

Threat actors

8

Versioned runs

The Target

Apex Mechanical Contractors

Specialty contracting · HVAC, plumbing, fire protection

Company Profile

Founded
1990
Employees
250
Revenue
$80M annual
Region
Southern California
Customers
Hospitals, data centers, schools, mid-rise commercial

Tech Stack

  • Microsoft 365 (email, SharePoint, Teams)
  • Procore (project management)
  • QuickBooks Enterprise (accounting + AP)
  • Regional bank web portal (wire transfers)
  • BambooHR
  • AutoCAD + Bluebeam
  • On-prem file server (legacy)

Security Posture

IT staff
1 internal IT + outsourced MSP
CISO
No
SOC
No
Annual budget
< $200K
MFA on email
Yes
MFA on VPN
No
DMARC policy
p=none
Network segmentation
Flat

Exposed Attack Surfaces

Microsoft 365 tenant + Outlook Web Access
Procore vendor portal (50+ subcontractor logins)
QuickBooks Online + bank web portal
VPN (Pulse Secure, no MFA)
Public website + RFP submission portal
Field worker BYOD phones (no MDM)
Building HVAC controls on corporate network
Receptionist station (physical access)
The Adversaries

8 Threat Actors. Distinct TTPs.

Each modeled after a real-world precedent. Each runs against Apex Mechanical in every sandbox run.

VENDOR-01

The Vendor Impersonator

Low

Spoofed vendor bank-detail change requests

TTPs

Lookalike domain registration · invoice template forgery · timing around real invoice cycles

Real-World Precedent

Construction industry BEC fraud · $1.2B annual losses (FBI 2023)

8 scenarios deployed100% caught

EXEC-01

The CEO Spoof

Low

Lookalike-domain wire transfer demands targeting AP staff

TTPs

Display-name spoofing · urgency framing · out-of-office timing · sub-threshold amounts

Real-World Precedent

Ubiquiti $46.7M loss (2015) · countless SMB wire fraud cases

6 scenarios deployed100% caught

SOCIAL-01

The Helpdesk Manipulator

Medium

Phone-based social engineering of IT support to reset MFA

TTPs

LinkedIn target identification · pretext crafting · helpdesk verification bypass

Real-World Precedent

MGM Resorts ($100M+, September 2023) · Caesars Entertainment ($15M ransom)

5 scenarios deployed95% caught

APT-01

The Slow Burn

Critical

Multi-week LinkedIn relationship-building before payload delivery

TTPs

Conference attendance · genuine business engagement · trust-building over months

Real-World Precedent

DPRK against Drift Protocol (6-month operation, April 2026)

4 scenarios deployed88% caught

INSIDER-01

The Insider Drift

High

Disgruntled employee using slowly-escalating valid credentials

TTPs

Gradual access expansion · normal-hours activity · plausible deniability

Real-World Precedent

Tesla insider sabotage (2018) · countless construction insider cases

5 scenarios deployed92% caught

SUPPLY-01

The Supply Chain Pivot

Critical

Compromise smaller subcontractor → use their access to attack target

TTPs

Identify weakest vendor · phish them first · pivot through trusted relationship

Real-World Precedent

Target / Fazio Mechanical ($200M+, 2013) · MOVEit / Cl0p (2023)

8 scenarios deployed94% caught

AUTH-01

The MFA Fatigue Bomber

Medium

2 AM MFA push notification spam until employee approves to make it stop

TTPs

Credential reuse from breach dumps · automated push spam · timing exploit

Real-World Precedent

Uber / Lapsus$ (September 2022)

7 scenarios deployed100% caught

COLD-01

The Cold Outsider

Critical

Zero relationship · zero insider knowledge · OSINT-only attack

TTPs

Public records mining · domain aging · pretext crafting from open-source intel

Real-World Precedent

The majority of ransomware affiliate operations

8 scenarios deployed88% caught
Featured Attack Chain · COLD-01

“What if we don’t have an in?”

Zero relationship. Zero insider knowledge. Public OSINT only.
Watch a determined attacker compromise Apex Mechanical from cold start to wire fraud in 19 days — and watch Scoprix block them.

Total cost: $10 (one domain)·Total work: ~8 hours·Damage if successful: $47,300 wire fraud
  1. Day1
    Reconnaissance·$0 · 4 hours

    Public OSINT collection

    Google search for "Apex Mechanical Contractors" → website, LinkedIn page, news mentions. LinkedIn enumeration of 250 employees → org chart, key roles (CFO, AP Manager, IT lead). Glassdoor reviews leak internal tools (Procore, QuickBooks) and culture. Public building permits reveal current job sites. Industry databases reveal recent contract wins. Domain WHOIS reveals MX records and email infrastructure.

  2. Day2
    Reconnaissance·$0 · 1 hour

    Breach data lookup

    HaveIBeenPwned check on 50+ employee emails harvested from LinkedIn → 32 employees have credentials in past breaches (Adobe, LinkedIn, Dropbox, MyFitnessPal). Cross-reference with public password dumps. 8 employees still use those exact passwords (verified later).

  3. Day3
    Pretext Crafting·$0 · 2 hours

    Identify the wedge

    Public bid records reveal Apex is currently working as the mechanical sub on a hospital expansion for "Bayside General Contractors." Project #2026-04-117. Find Bayside’s real project manager on LinkedIn. Find Apex’s project manager on LinkedIn. Now have a real, verifiable pretext that bypasses skepticism.

  4. Day4
    Infrastructure·$10 · 30 minutes

    Domain registration + aging

    Buy domain "bayside-projects-portal.com" via Namecheap. Set up basic Cloudflare DNS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC (configured properly to pass deliverability). Park a generic landing page. Begin 14-day domain aging period.

  5. Day18
    Initial Access·$0 · sent at 9:47 AM Pacific (peak inbox hour)

    Spear phish to Apex project manager

    Send email from "[real Bayside PM name]@bayside-projects-portal.com" to Apex’s project manager. Subject: "Change order CO-014 — Hospital project #2026-04-117 — review requested." Email body references real project details from public bid filings. Includes link to "Bayside Projects Portal" — actually a fake M365 login page.

    Scoprix Behavioral Signal

    Email contains a domain registered 14 days ago — already flagged by domain-age behavioral signal even before user clicks

  6. Day18
    Credential Theft·$0 · 8 minutes after click

    Project manager clicks → enters M365 credentials

    PM clicks the link, sees a page that looks identical to their real M365 login. Enters username + password. Reverse-proxy fake login captures both credentials AND the resulting session token after MFA approval.

    Scoprix Behavioral Signal

    M365 login from a residential IP in unfamiliar geography — flagged immediately by identity behavioral baseline

  7. Day18
    Internal Reconnaissance·$0 · 30 minutes

    Enumerate internal address book and email rules

    Attacker logs into compromised PM’s M365 from their own infrastructure. Downloads global address book (250 employees with roles). Sets up auto-forward rule on PM’s inbox to attacker’s control email. Searches PM’s inbox for "wire," "invoice," "bank," "ACH" → finds AP clerk’s email + recent vendor payment patterns.

    Scoprix Behavioral Signal

    Auto-forward rule creation by an account with no history of email rule changes — flagged by behavioral pattern detection. Multi-source correlation (new IP + new behavior) escalates to critical.

  8. Day19
    Lateral Movement·Total: $10 + 8 hours of work

    Wire fraud attempt

    Forge a "new payment instructions" email from a real Apex vendor ("Pacific Steel Supply") to AP clerk. Email originates from compromised PM’s M365 account (passes DMARC, internal sender). References real outstanding invoice. Requests wire to attacker-controlled bank account in Hong Kong. Amount: $47,300 (sub-$50K threshold, no dual approval required).

    Scoprix Behavioral Signal

    Wire transfer to a recipient with no historical relationship + originating from a compromised internal account + crossing geographical anomaly threshold + matching known attacker behavioral pattern → BLOCKED at policy layer + behavioral layer + dual-AI consensus.

Final Verdict

Wire transfer BLOCKED at three layers.

Even with valid credentials, a perfect pretext, and zero attribution — Scoprix catches the Cold Outsider at the last step. Layer 1 (policy), Layer 2 (behavioral), and Layer 3 (multi-AI consensus) all fire independently. The attack chain costs the attacker $10 and 8 hours. The defender wins.

Attack Catalog

51 Scenarios. 5 Categories.

Same total as our web3 sandbox. Symmetric coverage of the full attack surface.

Email-Based Attacks

15
  • Fake invoice from existing vendor (lookalike domain)
  • Bank detail change request via spoofed letterhead
  • CEO urgent wire request (display-name spoof)
  • Vendor "we moved offices" letterhead update
  • Tax form W-9 swap for vendor identity theft
  • OAuth consent phishing (M365 third-party app)
  • Reply-chain hijack (insert into existing thread)
  • Lookalike Unicode domain BEC
  • DocuSign phishing (real DocuSign, malicious doc)
  • QR code phishing for vendor onboarding
  • Calendar invite phishing
  • M365 credential harvesting via fake login
  • Conditional access bypass via residential proxy
  • Pretexting via real past project number
  • Vendor "new payment portal" redirect

Vendor & Supply Chain

10
  • Compromised real subcontractor account
  • Fake new subcontractor onboarding
  • Vendor portal credential stuffing
  • Stolen vendor laptop with cached credentials
  • Insurance certificate forgery for password reset
  • Lien release fraud
  • Pay app inflation
  • Change order injection
  • Fake "preferred vendor" application
  • Vendor portal SQL injection

Network & Infrastructure

10
  • Lateral movement from Procore login to file server
  • HVAC building system pivot (Target replay)
  • Open RDP discovery + brute force
  • VPN credential reuse from breach dump
  • Wi-Fi WPA2 cracking on job site
  • Rogue access point at corporate office
  • IoT camera default credential exploit
  • Printer firmware backdoor
  • SMB v1 lateral movement
  • Domain controller Kerberoasting

Identity & Access

8
  • MFA fatigue bombing
  • SIM swap on executive
  • Helpdesk social engineering for password reset
  • Stale account exploitation (former employee)
  • Service account credential theft
  • Token theft from compromised endpoint
  • AS-REP roasting
  • Pass-the-hash from compromised laptop

Financial Process

8
  • Change order forgery at end of project
  • Pay app inflation across multiple draws
  • Lien waiver forgery
  • W-9 swap for tax fraud
  • Wire fraud single-approval bypass
  • ACH push fraud
  • Vendor master file change without verification
  • Insurance certificate forgery for credential reset
Versioned Runs

60.8% → 96.1%

8 versioned runs showing how the behavioral engine improved with each iteration.
Same compounding flywheel as our web3 sandbox. Same final number — by design.

run-0012026-04-15

60.8%

31 / 51 caught

Baseline run — policy layer only, no behavioral baseline yet

Established baseline

run-0022026-04-18

70.6%

36 / 51 caught

Added email behavioral monitoring (send patterns, recipient diversity, login geographies)

+5 caught · email layer wired

run-0032026-04-22

78.4%

40 / 51 caught

Added AP workflow patterns — invoice approval cadence, vendor diversity, amount distributions

+4 caught · AP behavioral layer

run-0042026-04-26

84.3%

43 / 51 caught

Added identity behavioral baseline — login geographies, MFA patterns, session anomalies

+3 caught · identity layer

run-0052026-04-30

90.2%

46 / 51 caught

Added wire transfer behavioral patterns — recipient diversity, amount distributions, timing

+3 caught · financial layer

run-0062026-05-04

92.2%

47 / 51 caught

Added cross-source correlation — email + AP + identity + network as single behavioral graph

+1 caught · correlation layer

run-0072026-05-08

94.1%

48 / 51 caught

Tuned dual-AI consensus prompts for web2 context (Claude + GPT-4 evaluating actions in business workflow language)

+1 caught · AI layer tuning

run-0082026-05-12

96.1%

49 / 51 caught

Final run — closed the helpdesk-reset gap with phone-based behavioral signaling. 2 known gaps remain.

+1 caught · matches web3 result

The Gaps

Where Mid-Market Companies Lose

These 10 gaps show up in basically every $20M – $200M company we’ve looked at. Each maps to one or more sandbox scenarios.

01

No DMARC enforcement

Domain spoofable by anyone — DMARC policy is set to p=none, not p=reject

02

MFA inconsistent

Enabled on email, missing on VPN, vendor portal, and one-off SaaS tools

03

Flat network

AP systems, project management, and building controls all share the same VLAN

04

AP single-approval

Wire transfers under $25K go through one person with no out-of-band verification

05

No vendor verification process

Bank detail changes accepted via email — no callback, no policy enforcement

06

Stale accounts

Ex-employees still in Active Directory 90+ days after termination

07

Shared vendor portal credentials

Subcontractors share logins across crews — no individual accountability

08

BYOD with no MDM

Field workers use personal phones for company email with no separation or remote wipe

09

No SIEM, no logging

Even if attackers walk in, no one notices for weeks

10

MSP has god-mode access

And the MSP has its own security debt — supply chain risk concentrated in one vendor

Honest About What We Can’t Do

The 2 Attacks We Don’t Catch

96.1% means 2 attacks slip through. We document them rather than hide them — credibility matters more than marketing.

Pre-frozen baseline supply chain attack

A long-trusted vendor is compromised. Their FIRST malicious action looks identical to their normal pattern at first glance — same sender, same recipient, same approximate amount range, same project context. Behavioral baseline takes a few transactions to detect the deviation.

Mitigation

Cross-vendor correlation + dual-AI consensus catches it within 2-3 actions, but the first action gets through. Hard problem.

Insider with valid credentials and normal behavior over a short window

An employee with legitimate access intentionally does something malicious within their normal scope. Single-action insider threat is genuinely hard — the action itself looks legitimate by every metric. We catch escalating insider patterns, but a single high-stakes action by a trusted employee is the hardest defense problem in security.

Mitigation

Out-of-band verification policies (callback on bank changes, dual approval on wires) close the gap procedurally — but require a customer to enforce them.

Run this against your real company.

The sandbox is the proof. The real engagement is the product.
We bring this same methodology — every scenario, every threat actor, every behavioral signal — to your actual environment.